Adam Back is the well-off CEO of a company in the blockchain space. From that position, he gets to continue to use his expertise in the field with plenty of connections while having more than enough money without needing to risk revealing himself as Satoshi or risk de-stabilizing Bitcoin's value by using Satoshi's known wallets. It seems like the best possible outcome for someone in Satoshi's position.

I'll at least agree that I don't think any other living candidates for Satoshi make any sense. I can't believe someone who started a brand new influential field of study could fully exit from it while fully avoiding the proceeds from it, as would be necessary to believe in any other living candidate.

When I was a kid, I released a small GUI program online that I made with either VB6 or VB.NET. The program used the standard open-file dialog. When I created the installer for my program through VB's release wizard, there was a page where it pointed out that my program depended on a certain system library (because of the open-file dialog) and it asked me if I wanted to include that library in the installer. I think the default answer was yes, or maybe it wasn't but it sounded like an obvious thing to enable so I did it. Apparently this screwed over and broke open-file dialogs globally across Windows for everyone who wasn't on the same version of Windows as me. Whoops! It's too bad that VB had such a foot-gun in it, and that the article's workaround didn't save those users.

Waymos have since added support for YouTube Music thankfully.

The shared /tmp/ directory that can be used by processes of multiple users seems extremely prone to causing this type of issue. I wish there was a common convention for user-specific temp directories on Linux, because a whole class of vulnerabilities could go away.

MacOS handles this great by setting $TMPDIR to some /var/folders/.../ directory that's specific to the current user. Linux does have something similar with $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR (generally /run/user/$UID/), though it's stored in memory only which is a little different from usual for /tmp/, seemingly mainly intended for small stuff like unix sockets.

> Linux does have something similar with $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR (generally /run/user/$UID/), but it's stored in memory only

On a lot (at this point I assume most) of systems /tmp is also just a tmpfs, so it also is just in memory. /var/tmp usually is storage backed though.

> I wish there was a common convention for user-specific temp directories on Linux

There kind of is. /run/user/$userId is part of a tmpfs and is owned by the user. But it isn't always used when it should be.

Systemd also has a mechanism to create private /tmp directories for services.

which of course raises the question why the fuck snap doesn't use either of these mechanisms?

If the directory had a random name, the attacker could see that name and recreate it after /tmp is flushed.

Only if you reuse the same random name. Which would be silly.

Without snap, the front door is wide open: all applications you run are unconfined within your user account and can snoop on all of your files. On a normal single-user desktop system, almost everything valuable is within your user account, not root. If an attacker does want root (such as to install a rootkit that can hide itself or to access other user accounts), they can install an alias to sudo on your account and piggy-back on the next time you use it.

One 9 would be 90% (aka 0.9)

LLMs don't use a lot of electricity per user. Why should the fact that the energy usage happens in data centers instead of each user's house be an important moral factor?

If you have a project template or a tool that otherwise sets up a project but leaves it in the user's hands to create a git repo for it or commit the project into an existing repo, then it would be better for it to create a self-excepting .gitignore file than to have to instruct the user on special git commands to use later.

There are plenty of cases where the operator of archive.today refused to take down archives of pages with people's identifying information, so it's a huge double standard for them to insist on others to not look into their identity using public information.