I have noticed I can make a less sharp sound with my bike bell by ringing it a certain way. I use this to let pedestrians know I am coming but that they don't have to jump out of the way.
I just use fallocate to create a 1GB or 2GB file, depending on the total storage size. It has saved me twice now. I had a nasty issue with a docker container log quickly filling up the 1GB space before I could even identify the problem, causing the shell to break down and commands to fail. After that, I started creating a 2GB file.
Interesting! I did `fallocate -l 1G myfile` - very fast. Its all zeros but probably won't be compressed by the filesystem since its created with the fallocate() system call.
Almost all CPUs have AES native instructions so you'll be able to produce pseudorandom junk really fast. Even my old system will produce it at about 3Gb/s. Much faster than urandom can go.
That's very cool. Sadly running that exact command gets an incomplete file and error "error writing output file". It suggests adding iflag=fullblock (to dd). Running that makes a file of the correct size. But still gives "error writing output file". I suppose that occurs because dd breaks the pipe.
Lol, you're probably not wrong. But have you ever noticed that the most important papers tend to be on the clear and readable side of things? It's as if researchers understand that being understood is important, but deemphasize that when the paper itself isn't important in the first place. (Maybe if they're only publishing to not perish, not being understood is actually a goof thing from their perspective?)
"Simple" doesn't always mean "better". A car without seatbelts is less complicated than one with, but it definitely doesn't make it a better car.
Similarly, The original DNS protocol doesn't have any form of verification: it is is trivially easy for a MitM attacker to alter the responses - or even for a non-MitM one to send spoofed responses "in the blind". It also doesn't have any form of confidentiality: it is trivially easy for a MitM attacker to log all the requests you make, which essentially means your entire browser history.
It takes an awful lot of hacking to turn classic DNS into something even remotely representing a mature and well-designed protocol. By the time you are done bolting on all the other stuff it really isn't all that simple anymore.
> it is is trivially easy for a MitM attacker to alter the responses
This is true even for DOH. There is no guaranty that your TLS certificate issuer is to be trusted. And, by the way, most of them are in the USA, a country known for its surveillance programs.
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