Why counterattack, though? MAD is for deterence, so if one side attacks, MAD failed.
Counterattack will likely not help anything other than further escalation and further losses on the counter-attacking side. It would be kinda irrational at that point.
Your understanding of MAD seems fundamentally flawed. MAD works precisely because of the existence of a credible counter-attack strategy, it doesn't matter whether that attack is before or after the missiles strike.
He is absolutely correct. MAD is for deterrence. If your enemy already launched the missiles, there is no point in killing millions just for revenge.
Obviously, you cannot have this benevolent mindset in the first place, because your enemy will know he can destroy you without consequences and thus won’t be very much deterred from it.
Even the name MAD was a reminder to the other country that the US was indeed crazy enough to destroy and kill millions if USSR attacked.
Yes, I understand that correctly. You can have credible existance of counter attack ability for MAD, but it can still be irrational to counter-attack once one side drops a nuke.
It’s not just capacity to counter-strike, but willingness to do so.
This is a whole game theory thing that was developed in could war.
To be willing to kill millions even if it was pointless is part of the game: the enemy must be completely and absolutely convinced that a counter strike will happen. This is the only way to deter.
Absolute and complete certainty cannot be faked (given spies). It can only be provided if indeed the willingness to counter attack is real and enforced.
It's 1-part reinforcing MAD and 1-part guaranteed revenge.
Simply by existing it rules out any kind of first strike at all.
No matter which targets you hit (you can't destroy all the nukes, that is essentially impossible), even if Moscow is a glass crater and you successfully hit every nuclear command bunker this thing is still going to wipe you out.
Yes, all this does is end humanity - but the threat needs to be there to avoid the first strike in the first place and the contract is if you hit us with a nuke you are going to burn with us.
It's not rational, just like it's not rational to kill a hostage when your demands aren't met, but you need to actually carry the threat out, in order for your threats to be credible.
Isn't both sides alwats full of informants? I don't think you could confidently design a non functioning system and be sure the other side doesn't know it doesn't work
> I don't think you could confidently design a non functioning system and be sure the other side doesn't know it doesn't work
Well. The UK's "Letters of Last Resort" are kind of that. It intentionally keeps it ambiguous what will be the reaction of the British ballistic missile submarines in case of an unexpected decapitation attack.
The idea is that an incoming Prime Minister writes four identical, hand written letters to the commanders of the subs. They place these letters in safes on the submarines. Only the Prime Minister knows what the letters say.
In case the UK command structure is destroyed in a sudden decapitation strike, the submarine will detect this. For example by the fact that all naval broadcast cease to transmit. But nobody wants a single point of failure accidentally triggering a war, so they also check if the BBC 4 is still broadcasting, and they probably check other things too but the specifics are kept secret.
After the commander of the submarine, in agreement with a few other officers come to the conclusion that the UK is no more they open and read the letter. The letter gives them an instruction. It can tell them to retaliate with all they got. It can tell them to not retaliate, find a safe port and live the rest of their lives to the fullest. It can tell them to use their best judgement based on what they know. It can tell them to join the navy of a friendly country.
> Isn't both sides always full of informants?
The system assumes so yes. It is very hard to keep something secret once multiple people knows it. The idea here is that the secret is only known to one person, it is only distributed to a very limited set of very secure locations and everything is kept very low-tech to make it easier to manage the risk. Probably there are other undisclosed security arrangements too. (For example I wouldn't be surprised if the letter is carried by multiple trusted people, checking each other to prevent an enemy snooping or doing a switcheroo.)
Well the "counterattack guarantee" has to exist in order for MAD to be true. If A can attack B fast and hard enough that they can't counter attack, then there is no MAD.
As for rationality, don't assume everyone acts perfectly rationally -- or even partially.
I have to imagine there's a strong murderous urge to get back at whoever just burned your country down in nuclear fire, regardless of the greater good.
Aside from the MAD arguments others have pointed out, there is simple revenge.
You say this is irrational, but that depends on your values.
If you prioritize revenge over avoiding further losses, it is perfectly rationale.
For example, if someone killed my family, I may value killing them over my personal life. This doesn't make me irrational, but rather speaks to my value system and what I am optimizing for.
Counterattack will likely not help anything other than further escalation and further losses on the counter-attacking side. It would be kinda irrational at that point.