Americans may not think of themselves as an “empire,” but much of the world does. The average age of empires, according to a specialist on the subject, the late Sir John Bagot Glubb, is 250 years. After that, empires always die, often slowly but overwhelmingly from overreaching in the search for power.
Thinking about, that's around 5 generations, if we calculate, with each generation having roughly 50 years of power and relevant impact. So we have the first generation build the empire, the second solidifying it, and the next three upholding and slowly losing it. Interestingly, this mirrors how many rich families develop over time until they fall back into "poverty".
If you're talking about that book, he handpicked the empires and the "dates of decline" to fit the narrative harder than undergrad writing their thesis night before deadline. ;)
That's true, but those empires also had periods of traumatic decline and upheaval. Given if you grant those entities continuity for those time scales, there were absolutely periods in the middle where everything went to shit. Using a 1500 year number for Rome includes having half the empire drop off and die.
The more important idea isn't the 250 years (I agree), the idea is that it's not unreasonable to model aspects of America as an empire.
I’d argue that the US is experiencing the transition from republic to empire that Rome did — also during a period of decline and political corruption.
My point was that decline and regrowth, or even political transition as with Rome, happen frequently — not just decline followed by collapse (or “death”).
That's fair enough, but I feel like more modern examples are probably more relevant than Ancient Rome or China. The modern world offers significantly more ways for rival powers to assert influence in periods of weakness.
I'd also argue that for most people anxious right now, the idea that America might be in a transitional period of turmoil, but that it'll emerge stronger in 20 years (I made up that number) is of cold comfort.
China is also a modern example: they endured a political collapse and century of humiliation, but successfully reconstituted themselves into a world power comparable in many ways to imperial China. Russia at the end of the USSR has also successfully endured a period of collapse, during which Putin rose to power and successfully navigated to being an influential country. (Though, less so than China and with remaining challenges.)
> I'd also argue that for most people anxious right now, the idea that America might be in a transitional period of turmoil, but that it'll emerge stronger in 20 years (I made up that number) is of cold comfort.
Trump is popular precisely on that platform — that we can do hard work now and reverse the decline in the US.
I think people would be comforted to know that it would only be twenty years — a lot of Millennials in that movement don’t believe they’ll see it, but are nevertheless doing it for their children (or relatives). A not infrequent sentiment is “it’s over for us bros, but do it for the kids!”
That's cool, I didn't understand that about the movement. I'm honestly very skeptical and dismayed about many aspects of the movement. For example, I'm instinctively skeptical that the timescale and depth of turmoil and rebirth is truly understood and accepted amongst the majority of movement supporters. And I'm afraid of the tools being unleashed to achieve and lock in changes.
But it was also clear that there were many aspects of status quo that were deeply problematic. So I understand the urge at least.
So time to retrench and look inwardly instead of projecting power?
Maybe instead of meddling in international affairs via cover NGOs, let those people work out their own problems like we did in our early republic. We don't have to be captain save-a-hoe for the world.
the US is 249 years old.